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Abstract




John Capgrave’s Life of St Katherine of Alexandria has attracted much scholarly attention directed towards its preoccupation with images. The debates on the subject of image-worship which Capgrave gives to Katherine and her various pagan interlocutors have frequently been utilised by scholars as a lens through which to attempt to situate Capgrave’s writing in the context of fifteenth-century anxieties about the uses of images within religious practice, uses which were rendered particularly contentious in light of the body of Lollard anti-image polemical writing. The saint’s robust dismissal of pagan idols, and her refusal to accept the dubious honour of having a statue raised in celebration of herself, is most often regarded as the complex problematisation of the distinction between image and idol, and has been interpreted as revealing Capgrave’s own ambiguous or conflicted position in relation to contemporary debate on the subject, and hence, by extension, his views on Lollardy more broadly.​[1]​ Katherine is in some respects a saint ideally suited to be the focus of this discussion, given her own prominence in late-medieval artistic representations, especially in England.​[2]​ However, I suggest that the scholarly attention given to the Lollard context risks overlooking Capgrave’s broader interest in the Christian’s relationship with visual phenomena, an interest which is, as far as I am aware, unique to this version of the Life of St Katherine.​[3]​ In this paper I hope to redress the balance, arguing that Capgrave is deeply exercised by the nature of this relationship, which he perceives as both highly important and worryingly uncertain, and which, in a discussion heavily indebted to Augustine, he explores at length in the third book of his poem, the book in which Katherine is mystically united in marriage with Christ. 
Capgrave is not, of course, alone in incorporating a concern for the visual in his hagiography; arguably a focus on the scopic is one of the most distinctive characteristics of  many medieval saints’ lives, especially those of virgin martyrs. Time and again the lust of a pagan ruler is aroused by looking upon a beautiful young Christian virgin; her trial typically takes place in public, and may include being stripped naked before the ogling eyes of the populace; and her final execution, again in public, is almost invariably accompanied by visible signs of her sanctity, such as the flowing of milk from her wounds, which are intended to effect mass conversion among the viewers.​[4]​ Even in those cases where a life of sanctity ends peacefully, rather than in martyrdom, we encounter an emphasis on what is seen: spectacular miracles of healing or vengeance are a visible manifestation of saintly power, while the true gender of transvestite saints is revealed to the view of their astonished communities post mortem.​[5]​ What makes Capgrave’s attention to the visual in his Life of St Katherine different from other examples is his concern for the nature of vision in itself. In this text the act of looking is not simply a catalysing moment in the narrative, nor is it a way of amplifying the saint’s torments, or affirming her sanctified status. Instead, Capgrave uses the text to raise a number of questions: what different types of sight or vision are available to his protagonists? How might their capacity to see (or not) be connected with their spiritual condition?  Perhaps most importantly, to what extent is human perception to be regarded as reliable? Such questions were a matter of concern at both a scientific and a theological level in the Middle Ages, and in his Life of St Katherine Capgrave sets out to explore them.​[6]​
The visual culture of the later Middle Ages is a topic which has generated an enormous amount of scholarly attention, far more than can be summarised conveniently in this essay, and I therefore restrict myself to brief comments on a small number of scholarly interventions which have particularly influenced my thinking here. In the 1970s W.R. Jones produced a pair of essays tracing the contested role of images within Christian religious practice.​[7]​ His thoughtful discussions of the broad history of European iconoclasm and iconodulia, and of Lollard anti-image polemic in late-medieval England,  present a picture of complex, nuanced and ever-changing positions on the place of images in worship, which owed as much to political and economic concerns as they did to religious ones. Importantly, these essays highlight the fact that it was probably never possible to think of religious images entirely neutrally; their use and indeed their very existence always carried a potential theological or political charge. Even Gregory I’s famous defence of the use of images in worship, much quoted by later supporters of images, was tempered by an acute consciousness of the possibility that images may be utilised idolatrously.​[8]​ This being the case, medievalists with any interest in the visual, however broadly defined, need to be constantly mindful of the philosophical and psychological arguments deployed in debates concerning images, a caution which has informed my own reading of Capgrave’s work.
Turning to the physiology of vision, Peter Brown’s work on Chaucer and optical space conclusively demonstrates the widespread cultural availability of optical theories in the later Middle Ages, as a result of the dissemination of the content of technical treatises in sermons and encyclopaedias.​[9]​ Brown notes that in such forms this material was potentially accessible to a relatively wide audience, providing ‘evidence of a broad intellectual context that stimulated awareness of optical topics.’​[10]​ Brown examines some of the more specialised technical treatises on optics, and his discussion of the De aspectibus of Alhacen (the Latin translation of Kitab al-Manazir by Ibn al-Haytham) explores that text’s particular concern with the problem of visual error, which is especially germane to my discussion here.​[11]​ Physiology meets theology in the work of Robert Grosseteste, which imbues optical science with a theological dimension: ‘the external behaviour of light in the physical world […] has a direct bearing on the internal illumination of the soul; and the analogies that can be drawn between the nature of the outer eye and the inner eye are a means of elucidating scriptural truth.’​[12]​ The topos of physical vision as an indicator of spiritual illumination was a commonplace of later medieval homiletic writing, and this same melding of the scientific and spiritual implications of human perception lies at the heart of Capgrave’s text.
 The scholarly intervention which has most influenced my thinking is Barbara Newman’s magisterial Speculum article, ‘What Did It Mean to Say “I Saw”?’ Newman addresses her own question in an interdisciplinary study which explores the nature of visual and visionary phenomena, unpicking the sometimes confused theological response to visionary experience as she does so.​[13]​ Fundamental to this response is the distinction between the eyes of the body, the oculi carnis, on the one hand, and the eyes of the mind, the oculi mentis, on the other. Newman’s detailed survey of patristic and later medieval theorisations of visions carefully distinguishes the variety of possible sources of visionary experiences, and explores some of the contemporary practices utilised to facilitate or even actively encourage such experiences, as well as the questions and problems to which they could give rise. It is against this background that the present study is located.

Visions and images
John Capgrave was an Austin friar and sometime Prior Provincial of the Order, based for much of his life at Lynn in Norfolk; he was a scholar of some distinction, with a substantial written output.​[14]​ When considering the sources of his interest in the visual it seems natural to turn first to St Augustine, the reputed founder of his Order. Augustine was certainly deeply interested in the visual, and developed his ideas across a number of works written throughout his life.​[15]​ Fundamental to his thinking on the topic was his theory of signs, explicated most clearly in De Doctrina Christiana. Here Augustine is at pains to distinguish between that which is visible to the eye, and that which is represented by what is seen:

[A] sign is a thing which, over and above the impression it makes on the senses, causes something else to come into the mind as a consequence of itself:  as when we see a footprint, we conclude that an animal whose footprint this is has passed by; and when we see smoke, we know that there is fire beneath; and when we hear the voice of a living man, we think of the feeling in his mind; and when the trumpet sounds, soldiers know that they are to advance or retreat, or do whatever else the state of the battle requires.​[16]​ 

While some signs, such as the smoke and footprint, arise naturally, others (which Augustine calls ‘conventional’) are devised by living beings to communicate thoughts and ideas beyond the sign itself. The category of conventional signs upon which Augustine focuses his attention is that of words, but he does note that such signs may also relate to visible objects.​[17]​ This theory is important for later discussions of representation; conventional signs are instrumental in purpose, always gesturing beyond themselves, and thus should not be confused with that to which they refer, the res or thing itself.

Alongside his sign theory, Capgrave appears to have been greatly influenced by Augustine’s taxonomy of vision, described in the final book of his De Genesi ad litteram: 

When you read, ‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself’, three kinds of vision take place; one with the eyes, when you see the actual letters; another with the human spirit, by which you think of your neighbour even though he is not there; a third with the attention of the mind, by which you understand and look at love itself.​[18]​

This tripartite scheme of visions encompasses physical, bodily vision; the recollection or mental image created by the human spirit, or spiritual vision; and contemplation by the ‘attention of the mind’, or intellectual vision. The first category of vision is necessarily corporeal, since it utilises the physical sense with which humans see the visible world. The second category, although taking place within the mind, is nevertheless also to some extent corporeal, since it involves the recollection or creation of mental images, whether drawn from the faculty of memory or constructed by the imagination; in other words, it is a ‘kind of vision in which we think upon the images of absent bodies’, and make them present by a process of mental re-embodiment.​[19]​ Both categories are the preserve of the oculi carnis by virtue of their dependence upon images, whether these are received directly from the material world or created internally by the processes of memory or imagination. The third category, by contrast, refers to that for which there is no image – the thing itself. Thus it transcends the corporeal (even in the restricted sense of the second category) and reflects a state beyond the imagistic, and indeed beyond the reach of any human sensory faculty, a state of pure intellectual contemplation by the oculi mentis.​[20]​ In the two higher categories of vision Augustine asserts that ecstasy may be experienced. This arises when ‘the attention of the mind is totally turned aside and snatched away from the senses of the body’, so that the ‘attention is wholly taken up in gazing either at the images of bodies with the spiritual vision, or with the intellectual kind at incorporeal realities that no bodily image can represent’.​[21]​ However, access to such an experience is not easily won, but requires careful and rigorous preparation; his own lack of such preparation is expressed by Augustine with painful clarity in his Confessiones:

In an instant of awe, my mind attained to the sight of the God who is. Then, at last, I caught sight of your invisible nature, as it is known through your creatures. But I had no strength to fix my gaze upon them. In my weakness I recoiled and fell back into my old ways, carrying with me nothing but the memory of something that I loved and longed for, as though I had sensed the fragrance of the fare but was not yet able to eat it.​[22]​ 

The instantaneous and ecstasy-inducing glimpse of God attained by the oculi mentis cannot be sustained into a gaze, but falters and falls. Such a glimpse is, as Margaret Miles explains, the best we can hope for on earth, although in heaven we may look forward to the highest reward of all, permission to gaze upon God.​[23]​ Even so, by dint of careful training and preparation we can maximise both our physical and spiritual visual capacities, and responsibility lies with the faithful ‘to exercise and strengthen the capacity for vision by concentrating the energy of longing on the desired object’;​[24]​ it is the absence of this training which results in Augustine’s agonising failure in Book VII of his Confessiones. In his own version of the Life of St Augustine Capgrave omits this episode of failure, and indeed most of the discussions of inner and outer vision which appear in the Confessions; however, he was surely aware of Augustine’s exposition in De Genesi ad litteram, not least because he had himself also produced a commentary on Genesis, and is highly likely to have examined other earlier commentaries before embarking upon his own. Certainly he reveals his indebtedness to Augustine’s tripartite scheme, or some variant of it, in Book Three of The Life of St Katherine, as will become apparent below.
The unique and defining quality of the state of intellectual vision according to Augustine is that it can never be deceived; while bodily and spiritual vision can be mistaken, or manipulated by demonic possession, this can never happen to visions of the intellectual kind. ​[25]​ The problem of the propensity of the individual to be deceived by visions, both bodily and spiritual, is taken up by later writers. Alhacen, taking an ‘essentially materialist approach to optical matters’, discusses this difficulty in wholly scientific terms.​[26]​ He is acutely aware of the tendency of the eye to be deceived, and categorizes visual error in three ways: errors of perception; errors of misrecognition; and errors of inference. The first type arises as a result of unfavourable circumstances which physically impede perception, such as fog; the second arises when an observer misinterprets what he sees; and the third is effectively the result of attempting to make that which is seen accord with familiar pre-existing data in the mind of the observer.​[27]​ In Alhacen’s work these errors are exclusively failures of bodily vision, and there is no suggestion that they might have moral implications, nor indeed any source beyond the human body and the material world in which it exists. Yet not all commentators considered the situation to be so clear-cut. William of Ockham raises the somewhat alarming possibility that God himself can act in ways which may deceive human perception: ‘God can cause an act of believing through which I believe a thing to be present that is [in fact] absent’.​[28]​ While acknowledging that it is impossible that something can seem present if it is absent, Ockham demonstrates that God can make mankind believe that this is the case. Thus the nature of objective reality remains unchanged, and the human senses are not actually altered; nevertheless, a belief instilled in the subject by God can have the same effect as if those things had changed. The mechanics of this process are explained elsewhere in the Quodlibetal Questions, where Ockham asserts that whatever God can produce through secondary causes, he can produce directly in the absence of those causes: ‘he is able to produce an intuitive cognition of a corporeal thing by the mediation of a [corporeal] object. Therefore, he is able to produce this cognition immediately by himself’.​[29]​ Nor is this power limited to the cognition of corporeal objects; anything can be produced directly in this way if it has previously existed or is capable of existence. In other words, anything that God has seen in his own mind, whether created or not, can, if he chooses, be made manifest to mankind by this process. Both bodily and spiritual vision, being dependent upon images, are susceptible to this form of deception, a possibility which Capgrave explores at some length in his Life of St Katherine.
While God may choose to manipulate human vision for beneficial ends, the devil may also exploit the weaknesses of image-dependent perception, a possibility which gave rise to the theory and practice of discretio spirituum. Developed over many hundreds of years, at its simplest it may be described as ‘the ability to distinguish spirits sent by God from those sent by the devil.’​[30]​ Its most important theorist in the early fifteenth-century was Jean Gerson, who in a series of three texts produced a synthesis and development of previous writings stretching back to the Church Fathers.​[31]​ Criteria were drawn up to aid in distinguishing divine from diabolic visions, and as Rosalynn Voaden explains, these did not remain restricted to the sphere of academic theologians, but became diffused to a much wider audience.​[32]​ Voaden focuses primarily on the discourse of discretio spirituum in relation to the reported experiences of women visionaries, but its broader application is clear. Visual phenomena perceived by bodily or spiritual sight are fundamentally untrustworthy, and without considerable care and attention, which may include complex theological diagnostics, humans are at risk of being deceived by their oculi carnis.
 The deceptive possibilities of the oculi carnis are taken up in a slightly different way in Lollard polemical writings on the subject. The concern as it is most frequently expressed focuses not on active intervention by either God or the devil, but on the much more fundamental fissure between sign and signified identified by Augustine. The anxiety articulated in such writings is that simple people will not grasp the proper ontological status of an image or other visual representation, believing it to be the thing itself, the res, rather than merely a sign:

For summe lewid folc wenen þat þe ymagis doun verreyly þe myraclis of hemsilf, and þat þis ymage of þe crucifix be Crist hymsilf, or þe seynt þat þe ymage is þere sett for lickenesse. And þerfore þei seyn ‘þe swete rode of Bromholme’, ‘þe swete rode of Grace’, ‘þe swete rode at þe norþe dore’, ‘oure dere Lauedy of Walsyngham’, but nouʓt ‘oure Lauedy of heuene’, ny ‘oure lord Iesu Crist of heuene’.​[33]​

This type of error leads the laity to indulge in excessive expenditure on the decoration of images, diminishing their capacity to give alms to the poor; it also fosters a superstitious reverence for specific places, undermines the concept of God as omnipresent, encourages the questionable excesses of pilgrimage, and fills the coffers of greedy clerics at major shrines. These practical disadvantages are the inevitable consequence of a failure to understand the nature of the sign:

So siþen þise myraclis pleyinge ben onely syngnis, loue wiþoute dedis, þei ben not onely contrarious to þe worshipe of God, þat is boþe in signe and in dede, but also þei ben gynnys of þe deuuel to cacchen men […] for þese myraclis pleyinge been verrey leesyng as þei ben sygnis wiþoute dede.​[34]​

The real spiritual danger inherent in an excessive reliance on corporeal vision, such as that used to watch miracle plays, is that it may serve to alienate the watcher from God. If the vision is arrested at the sign – that is, if the watcher simply watches, and does not enter into contemplation of that which lies behind the sign – then the true nature of God who is ‘boþe in signe and in dede’, creator of the appearance but also of the reality that lies behind it, cannot be properly apprehended. Love of God is replaced by devotion to a simulacrum, an empty gesture pointing towards nothing.

The failure of human sight
In Book Three, the physical and spiritual centre of Capgrave’s Life of St Katherine, the protagonist undergoes the transformative experience of ascending to the holy city in order to be united in mystical marriage with Christ. It is in this Book, I argue, that Capgrave most clearly reveals his indebtedness to the Augustinian intellectual tradition in relation to visual phenomena, as well as his own nagging uncertainties about this topic. Unlike Books Four and Five, in which the role of images in worship is so hotly debated, here it is the very nature of visual phenomena themselves, and the Christian’s relationship with them, which is under scrutiny; Book Three is permeated with events and details which explore human perception, and especially its failures. 
In the second chapter, Adrian, the aged hermit who will be Katherine’s guide on her journey towards Christian understanding, is lamenting the failure of his physical powers when ‘A blessed syght onto his eye was browte: | A qween, he sey, of vysage and stature | Passyng full mech alle erdely creature’.​[35]​ The sudden appearance of the beautiful and richly arrayed lady has an immediate salutary effect up the old man, restoring his physical vigour, stimulating the circulation of the blood and giving him the impression of renewed youth. Approaching her with caution, Adrian initially refuses the lady’s request to undertake a journey to Katherine on the grounds that it would violate his eremitic vows, but when she reveals herself to be the Virgin Mary he is quick to apologise. Her appearance was so unexpected, he explains, that his ‘wytt was goo’ when he saw her, hence his failure of recognition (251). Adrian’s age-related decline might well have hindered his powers of perception in any case; the dramatic reversal of that decline, far from heightening his perceptions, seems simply to have confused them, as his mind struggles to keep up with the changes in his bodily wellbeing.​[36]​ There is a degree of humour in this moment of visual failure, which offers parallels with January’s supposed optical confusion at the conclusion of Chaucer’s Merchant’s Tale:

But, sire, a man that waketh out of his sleep,
He may nat sodeynly wel taken keep
Upon a thyng, ne seen it parfitly,
Til that he be adawed verraily.
Right so a man that longe hath blynd ybe,
Ne may nat sodeynly so wel yse,
First whan his sighte is newe come ageyn,
As he that hath a day or two yseyn.
Til that youre sighte ysatled be a while
Ther may ful many a sighte yow bigile.​[37]​

May is, of course, glossing her arboreal sexual antics as a case of misperception brought about by January’s sudden return to ocular health. Capgrave’s subject matter is, on the face of it, rather different from Chaucer’s, but the source of Adrian’s genuine confusion is the same as that of January’s purported error, and there is humour in both situations.​[38]​ Yet Adrian’s moment of misrecognition also raises serious questions about his reliance on merely physical sight.​[39]​ Having been a hermit for some sixty years, one moreover who has prayed to God for help immediately before the unexpected appearance, it is somewhat surprising that Adrian was not immediately alert to the possibility that the lady before him was a divine messenger. Medieval spiritual disciplines such as contemplation, prayer and physical deprivation were recognised as an appropriate preparation for visionary experience, and his ascetic life as a hermit would surely have included such practices.​[40]​ Nevertheless, Adrian seems entirely unprepared for the vision he encounters, and conspicuously fails to interpret it correctly, as the unreliability of his oculi carnis leads directly to hermeneutic uncertainty. In this brief episode at the very start of Book Three Capgrave reveals an interest in vision in both its physical and spiritual dimensions, particularly focused upon failures of discernment, an interest which he pursues throughout the remainder of the Book.
Initially Katharine’s visual perceptions prove equally faulty when Adrian, having accepted the Virgin’s commission, arrives at her palace; she doubts his claim to have been sent by a great lady because his appearance is so unprepossessing:

Than wondyr we sore that sche sent us here
So evyll arayd, so sympyll a messangere,
For to hir astate it had be full convenient
To send moo men and not send on alone,
Where sche so many hath at hir comaundment!
Eke, as me thinkyth, to swech a grete persone
Schuld long all servauntis that are in hir wone
To clothe more clenly for worchyp of hir hous,
For, syre, your clothyng semeth not ryght precyous. (531-39)

Adrian, she believes, simply does not look right; he lacks an appropriate entourage and is frankly none too clean. Being excessively reliant on the power of the oculi carnis, Katharine has made the common human error of failing to separate the sign from the res, being unable to distinguish what she sees from that which it represents. Presented with Adrian’s solitary arrival and worn attire she fails to look beyond this in order to interpret his true status and purposes, and only after his lengthy persuasion can she be persuaded to accompany him back to his home. On their return, Adrian is dismayed to discover that his hermitage has inexplicably disappeared, and Katherine urges him to have faith in the lady upon whose errand he has been engaged. At this point her attention is suddenly  directed upwards towards the sight of the shining walls of Jerusalem, the heavenly city, but this remains entirely invisible to Adrian. Capgrave attributes this exclusion from the privileged vision to divine intervention; God, he says, has deliberately placed Adrian in a ‘trauns’ in order that he should not become swollen with pride on account of ‘so grete sytys and of swech dalyauns | Whech that he had with oure Ladye’ (869, 871-72). The divine gift of a vision of the Virgin must be balanced by a corrective deprivation, and it is not until Adrian has wept in recognition of his unworthiness that the sight of heaven is vouchsafed to him. Crucially, however, Katherine has not been denied this sight; even at this early stage in the narrative, while she is still a pagan, Capgrave is at pains to emphasise that she already sees with a more developed level of spiritual vision than her Christian guide.
Adrian’s visual faculties are the subject of further divine manipulation a little later, when the pagan Katherine is required to undergo the sacrament of baptism prior to her mystical marriage with Christ. Although the baptism is performed in heaven, Adrian, being ordained, is the only person present who is qualified to administer the sacrament, a detail of Christian orthodoxy carefully explained by the Virgin.​[41]​  When Katherine is stripped for the ceremony a film of blindness descends and covers his eyes, only lifting when the baptism is over and the young queen is ready to enter into the presence of Christ. Capgrave does not explain the reason for this second period of blindness; it may simply be a convenient way of preserving Katherine's modesty, and it does once again demonstrate God’s capacity to control human vision. However, I suggest that something more significant may be at stake. The administering of the sacrament of baptism – or indeed any sacrament - in heaven is surely philosophically problematic if not downright paradoxical, given that a sacrament is an earthly sign connecting mankind to heavenly reality. As the event takes place in the reality of heaven, it ceases to be a sign and becomes instead the thing itself – and it is this that Adrian cannot be permitted to see with his physical eyes, since the res in this case is of necessity discernible only to intellectual vision.​[42]​
This willingness on God’s part to intervene and manipulate human perception is not limited to individuals; entire cities may find themselves deceived. When Adrian and Katharine first leave Alexandria, all the citizens are providentially afflicted with a form of temporary blindness:

Ryght so seyth oure byble
Of the men of Sodom aboute Lothis hous,
How thei neyther dores ne gates myght fynde.
Godd smet hem thoo with a sekenes mervelous –
It is called acrisia, it maketh men seme blynde 
As for a tyme. (798-803)

The ‘acrisia’ mentioned by Capgrave corresponds to the Greek ἀορασίᾳ, the word used in the Septuagint to describe the temporary blindness inflicted upon the men of Sodom; and just as the inhabitants of Sodom are rendered blind in order that they cannot molest Lot’s visitors, so the Alexandrians are prevented from observing, and perhaps resisting, the departure of their queen.​[43]​ In both cases the blindness is a form of punishment meted out to the general populace, which offers God’s favoured people – Lot and his family, Katherine and Adrian – the opportunity to escape actual or potential hostility unseen.​[44]​ In neither case, however, is the blindness permanent; the men of Sodom and Alexandria regain their sight and receive lasting punishment in other ways. This recovery of sight is quite different from the biblical examples of the miraculous healing of the blind, of course, since it is not a sign of redemption from sin but simply a deferral of lasting sanctions to some later time. ​[45]​ Nor is mass blindness the only strategy of deception available to God to further his plans for Katherine. As she prepares to return to Alexandria after her mystical union with Christ, the Virgin explains that measures have been taken to ensure that her absence will not have been noticed:

Whyl ye with my Sone were in the ayre
A qween leche to yow all that tyme kept
Youre grete astate […]
There was no man withinne that mote
That cowde aspye in hir womanhede
Ony manere differens, sat sche or yede.
My Sone ordeyned this for youre sake. (1461-63, 1466-69)

Having first visited blindness upon the inhabitants of Alexandria in order to assist the saint’s departure, in a further act of visual deception a fully-functioning simulacrum of Katherine has been produced to fill her absence. The substitute Katherine has eaten, slept, given orders and pronounced judgement as if she were the real thing, and the Alexandrians, relying upon the oculi carnis, have been content to serve the empty signifier of royal authority.​[46]​ This is unsurprising; the citizens had no reason to disbelieve the evidence of their own eyes, and would in any case have had little or no power to resist such an exercise of divine might. Like the other instances of celestial manipulation, this incident demonstrates the truth of Ockham’s assertion of God’s power to induce a belief in physical phenomena which runs counter to reality; and all these instances are, in their context, examples of this power being put to unexceptionable use. Nevertheless we might feel that there is something disturbingly arbitrary about the events narrated by Capgrave; the sheer facility with which God induces mass visual deception leaves the reader uneasily aware of the necessity for constant vigilance in relation to visual phenomena, while at the same time uncomfortably demonstrating that any such vigilance can readily be circumvented by the omnipotent deity. Capgrave seems to me to be using these examples to draw attention to the inevitably fallibility of the oculi carnis, faulty by nature and also susceptible to divine manipulation, and hence to demonstrate the very limited extent to which we can ever hope to ‘see’ clearly. 

The vision of heaven and the face of God
The heavenly city into which Katherine and Adrian enter is in many respects notably physical and concrete; Capgrave’s imagined heaven is an architectural environment of walls and rooftops, gates and buildings.​[47]​ When it is first glimpsed, it is described as a 'castell' and a 'toure' (905), and at its centre lies a temple, with a side chapel attached for baptisms. The clarity of Capgrave's vision here is such that it is almost possible to draw a diagrammatic representation of the heaven he describes, in the form of a recognisably contemporary architectural edifice, the construction of which divides it into different spaces which are clearly delineated by physical boundaries. The boundaries are not purely spatial, however, but reflect a social hierarchy among heaven's inhabitants. For example, having been greeted by citizens in the first ward of heaven, Katharine and Adrian pass into the second ward where they are received 'mech bettyr and of worthyere men' (940). The magnificence of the inhabitants increases further when they arrive at the doors of the temple itself: 'There came kynges, there cam emperoures' (954). Heaven, then, is predictably orderly and hierarchical in both its spatial and social organisation, the lesser souls giving way to the greater as the earthly visitors travel physically from its periphery to its centre. The most exalted beings are the souls of martyrs, the highest order of heaven's citizenry, whose garments are marked with signs of their earthly sufferings:

Upon her habytes certen tokenes thei bere –
Sum man oo tokyn, sume man another bare
Aftyr the passyones whech thei suffred here.
So were thei merked with tokenes full bare;
Thoo toknes were sett there, ryght to declare
That men had thei be and with grete distresse
Oute of this herde com to that holynesse. (967-73)

The repetition of the word ‘tokyn’ – meaning symbol, or visual representation – emphasises the importance of the visible marks upon the clothes of the martyrs, which guarantee their status. These ‘tokenes’ are apparently perceptible by physical vision, but they contrast sharply with other visible signs in being unconcealed (‘full bare’) and absolutely reliable; unlike Adrian’s poor attire which so deceived Katherine at their first meeting, here the sign and the res are so closely connected as to ensure complete hermeneutic transparency. Yet even as Capgrave presents his readers with this image of heaven as highly physical, orderly and hermeneutically stable, he also offers a contrasting view which serves to disguise or render indistinct the heavenly vision. Katherine’s description of the holy city when seen from afar dwells on its extreme brightness:

The woundyrfull wallys schynnyng as sune,
Swech another thing was nevyr wrowte – 
There was nevyr swech thing in erde begune!
The stones are bryght, the roves are not dun.
Loke up, man, see ye noght yon syght –
The castell yondyr whech schynyth so bryght? (884-89)

When Adrian is finally permitted to see the city, he too is struck by its appearance ‘bryghtere than glas’ (900). Thus much of what they see is not in fact heaven itself, but the light reflected by its shining surfaces; dazzled by this luminosity, they can distinguish little detail.​[48]​ Again we might turn to Alhacen for some guidance; the failure of perception described by Capgrave is a result of the adverse physical circumstance of excessive light which, paradoxically, serves to cloud human vision. Augustine, too, addresses this problem in his early work, noting that while some eyes are so healthy that they can immediately gaze upon the sun itself, others are struck violently (feriuntur) by the very light they long to see.​[49]​ It seems that Capgrave would agree; the light shed by his heaven is simply too bright to be tolerated by human sight. 
On arriving at heaven’s temple for her marriage to Christ, Katherine finds herself unable to enjoy the greatest heavenly privilege of all - the sight of the face of God. 

Than sey sche oure Lord whech all thing makyd,
Whech had called hir to that noble grace,
Sittyng full reall - but upon His face
Durst sche not loke, for no manere thing,
So was sche aferde at hir fyrst comyng. (983-87)

Katharine's inability to see is not, however, the result of God actively intervening to prevent her; rather, as a consequence of original sin, which leaves her unfit for so exalted a sight, she simply dares not look. ‘Hir body’, Capgrave tells us, ‘is cause. It must be claryfyed, | And all the carnalyté fully puryfyed, | Or sche swech thinges eythere fele or grope.’ (993-95) The implication is that, once duly cleansed, Katherine will be vouchsafed a glimpse of the divine visage. Yet this is not precisely what happens. Having accepted the sacrament of baptism, the Virgin Mary intercedes on her behalf, imploring her son to reveal himself:

I have browte here the doghtyr of clennesse,
Prayng Thee, Lorde, with alle humbylnesse
That Thou schew now the blysse of Thi face
Onto Thi spouse [...]
So graunte hir now that hye portrature
Of Thi blyssyd ymage to se and beholde. (1161-64, 1167-68)

While the Virgin first asks her son to show his face, she then modifies or perhaps clarifies her request, asking that the ‘portrature’ of his ‘ymage’ might be seen. During the ensuing moments, including the marriage ceremony itself, there is no indication of what, if anything, Katherine sees; she bows before Christ and is lifted up by him, they enter into discussion, and he gives her a ring, but of visual stimuli we learn nothing. The omission leaves us in a state of uncertainty, with the Virgin’s terms – ‘portrature’ and ‘ymage’ – still ringing in our ears. In the context of late-medieval concerns about the place of images within worship, this choice of language, speaking of Christ's face in artistic terms as an image, an act of 'portrature', is very striking. Its truly unsettling nature is, however, only subsequently made apparent, when, in Books Four and Five, Katherine twice refuses to accept a statue made in her own honour (IV, 881-91, V, 400-525), effectively declaring such ‘ymages’ to be worthless. Yet this is surely the very point which Capgrave is trying to make in the mystical marriage ceremony. Reverting to Augustine’s tripartite taxonomy of visions, we recall that images pertain only to the lower two levels of vision, the bodily and the spiritual, while the highest level of pure contemplation, the intellectual vision, is by its very nature non-imagistic; and it is only through the intellectual vision that the believer is vouchsafed the glimpse of God himself, through the oculi mentis. Thus the divine visage can never be ‘seen’ in any ordinary sense of that word; it can only be touched or apprehended in the imageless world of the intellect. When the Virgin speaks of the ‘ymage’ of Christ she is expressing precisely the point that the physical presence which Katherine is longing to see is that which she can never see, and the best that can be substituted is an ‘ymage’ or simulacrum – which is, of necessity, as inadequate in spiritual terms as any statue which Maxentius might choose to erect in the market place in Alexandria.
	If Katherine, who is to become one of the major saints of the Christian church, is denied sight of her divine spouse within the very bounds of heaven, then we might initially feel pessimistic about the prospects for ordinary Christians. However, Capgrave’s position is not, I suggest, a pessimistic one, but is based firmly upon his Augustinian understanding of the truth of the relationship between God and man, as expressed through visual perception. Both bodily and spiritual visions are necessarily carnal since they rely on the existence of images of things, whether real or imaginary; only the highest form of vision, the intellectual, moves beyond the need for images to a pure contemplation of the thing itself. Katherine, notwithstanding her mystical marriage, has yet to grasp this truth; she must learn to desire the intellectual, not the physical, vision of Christ, and it is to this level of vision that ordinary Christians should also aspire. The saint is thus presented as both an exemplar and a fellow pilgrim on the journey to Christian understanding. The difficulty of this journey lies in the fact that the human concept of ‘seeing’ is generally too materialistic to permit the apprehension of God with the oculi mentis, at least not without significant effort. As humans, we relate to the world first and most immediately through our sensible perceptions, and it is through these that we are most readily drawn to God. It is by viewing images, or by conjuring them up in the mind through the processes of imagination and memory, that we channel our devotion, notwithstanding the fact that at the physical level our perceptions are flawed by adverse conditions such as the decrepitude of age or too much brightness, or else are subject to the deceptive influence of God’s will. The theological need to move beyond the visible sign to the res, the thing itself, stumbles at the hurdle of human nature, which always relies on the physically visible instead of strengthening itself to cultivate the pure contemplation of the intellectual gaze. 
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